The concept of total war, as practiced in the modern age, holds
that a worker on the Home Front is as important as a soldier on
the Battle Front. Without the worker to produce the munitions,
the soldier could not prevail. While modern total war has its
origins in the American Civil War of 1861 to 1865, it was not
until the Second World War, when long-range, multi-engine
aircraft capable of carrying large bomb loads became available,
that significant force could be applied directly to the Home
Front. The German Home Front became an extension of the Battle
Front in 1942 with the initiation of a campaign of sustained
strategic bombardment. This campaign, begun by the British Royal
Air Force, was joined by the United States Army Air Forces in
1943. This sustained strategic bombardment offensive placed great
strain upon the German Home Front and made a significant
contribution to Allied victory during the Second World War.
While balloon equipped observation units served in several
campaigns as early as the American Civil War, aviation was first
used to a significant degree during the First World War. During
the war, fighter, observation, and bombardment units equipped
with aircraft, balloons, and zeppelins were deployed in great
numbers. Imperial German air units attempted to conduct a
strategic campaign against the United Kingdom, bombing targets
from both zeppelins and aircraft. These attempts were largely
ineffective due to limitations of the technology.
Postwar military theorists, such as Italy's Guilio Douhet,
predicted that modern bombers would always get through to their
targets. These bombers, it was predicted, would devastate enemy
cities with explosive and poison gas bombs. Civilian casualties
would be so great that wars would be ended even before the armies
could take to the field.1
When Nazi Germany began rearmament in the 1930s, one of the first
goals was to build a strong Luftwaffe, or Air Force. The
Luftwaffe was organized and equipped to support the Wehrmacht,
or Army, in the new lightning warfare tactics known as
Blitzkrieg. German industry provided tactical bombers, dive
bombers, and fighters which were equal to any in Europe. The Luftwaffe
was a tactical air force designed to attack targets directly in
support of ground units or targets immediately behind the front
lines, such as airfields, supply depots, bridges, and troop
concentrations, again in direct support of the ground offensive.2
When Germany launched the invasion of Poland, the air tactics
employed provided devastating results, the Polish Air Force and
Army were shattered. During the defense of Warsaw in the fall of
1939, German bombers raided nonmilitary targets in order to
pressure the surrender of the city, even though Germany, like all
European powers, had forsworn the use of bombers against civilian
targets. Likewise, the city of Rotterdam was devastated in Spring
1940 during the German invasion of the Low Countries and France.
Overall, German air power was critical to the German defeat of
France and the occupation of Western Europe in Spring 1940.
By Summer 1940, the Wehrmacht was poised on the English
Channel, ready to invade Britain. The Luftwaffe needed
to seize control of the airspace over the landing beaches for the
invasion to succeed and initiated an aerial campaign against the
Royal Air Force, which came to be known as the Battle of Britain,
on 13 August 1940. The Luftwaffe conducted an intensive
campaign against Fighter Command of the Royal Air Force,
attacking airfields, radar sites, command and control centers,
and aircraft production plants with such intensity that the
British air defense establishment nearly collapsed.3
With destruction of the Royal Air Force nearly in hand, Adolf
Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to turn its attention to
London and bomb the British into submission.
On Saturday, 7 September 1940, the Luftwaffe began the
first of 57 consecutive days of raids on London. At first, the
raids were predominantly daylight ones against strategic targets.
As losses mounted, however, the raids switched to night bombing
raids against the London urban area. Given the limitations of
both aircraft and navigational systems, the Luftwaffe
was forced to conduct inaccurate area attacks against London and
other British cities. The citizens of London were the first
inhabitants of a modern city to undergo systematic bombing over a
long period of time. Some urban areas received as many as 31-52
bombs per 100 acres. These bombs were either high explosive or
incendiary and ranged in size from small, 1 kilogram
magnesium/thermite incendiary bombs to 1,000 kilogram
"Hermann" and 2.5 ton SC 2500 "Max" bombs.4
The courage of the citizens of London and all of the affected
areas of Britain was reflected in the fact that they withstood a
aerial assault that their prewar government assumed would shatter
their will to resist. The bombing, if anything, galvanized public
opinion and actually strengthened British resolve to resist the
continued attacks of Nazi Germany even though Britain, with the
exception of the Commonwealth, was without allies after the fall
of France in spring 1940.
The German strategic offensive against Britain failed due to
inadequate technology and insufficient numbers. The Luftwaffe
had entered the war with bombers and fighters designed to attack
tactical targets. The bombers did not have the payload or the
defensive firepower and the fighters did not have the range to
properly conduct a carefully conducted strategic bombing
offensive. Hitler gave up on the invasion of Britain and turned
his attention once again to the East. The same problems which had
plagued the campaign against Britain also presented themselves
the following year when the Luftwaffe was unable to
attack industrial targets in the Soviet Union.
The Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force was the only way for
British power to be brought directly to bear on Germany. However,
Britain was under tremendous strain during the early years of the
war and was unable to fully develop its bombardment offensive. In
December 1941, a raid on Hamburg cost Bomber Command 13 aircraft
of 129 dispatched.5 However, by May 1942, Bomber
Command was able to mount a 1,000 aircraft nighttime area raid on
the Ruhr city of Cologne. In ninety minutes on the night of 30/31
May 1942, 1,500 tons of bombs fell on the city. According to
historian Earl Beck, "The bombings were to prove damaging to
the houses and buildings of the cities but took a relatively
minimal toll of people and had a relatively insignificant effect
upon war production. The bureaucracy made heroic efforts to deal
with the bombing damages as they occurred. But behind the figures
lies the story of lost homes, of constant fear and uncertainty,
of the movements of thousands of people to unfamiliar places and
often ungracious hosts. Each bomb that fell shrieked the words
"defeat," although those beneath the bombs scarcely
dared whisper it."6
The bomber offensive continued throughout the summer and fall of
1942, with Bomber Command conducting area attacks against many of
the cities found in the industrial heartland of Germany, the
Ruhr. By September 1942, the Ruhr city of Duisburg had suffered a
lost of over 98 per cent of its housing space. By Christmas 1942,
food shortages were occurring in Germany. Sugar shortages were
avoided by the importation of 110,000 tons of sugar from Hungary,
750,000 tons of wheat from occupied Polish territory, and
sunflower seeds from the Ukraine. The potato harvest, on the
other hand, was good enough in 1942 that the weekly ration was
increased from 2.5 kilograms per person to 4.5 kilograms per
person.7 These food shortages, however, were not
directly the result of the bombing offensive of 1942. Rather,
they were more the result of the overall effects of the war on
the German economy.
The United States entered the war in December 1941, but much like
Britain, was busy dealing with the attacks by Imperial Japanese
forces in the Pacific and German submarines in the Atlantic.
Additionally, the development of a strategic bombardment force
takes considerable time to create; aircraft have to be built,
crews have to be trained, bases have to be constructed, and
tactics have to be developed. By December 1942, however, General
Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, Commanding Officer of the US
Army Air Forces (USAAF), was advocating the establishment of an
overall air command for the European and Mediterranean theaters
of operation which would coordinate the strategic offensive
against Germany.8
The British campaign of nighttime attacks continued while the
USAAF daylight forces gained strength and developed tactics in
attacks against targets in occupied France. By mid-1943, however,
RAF Bomber Command was ready to apply maximum effort to Hamburg,
Germany's second largest city. On 24 July 1943, 740 British
bombers raided Hamburg. Good accuracy was achieved, with 306
bombers dropping their payloads within 3 miles of the target. The
raid was also the first use of "window," which was
aluminum foil dropped to jam German air defense radars,
drastically reducing their effectiveness. On 25 and 26 July,
American bombers raided the harbor area of the city. On 28 July,
722 bombers returned and ignited a firestorm in the city, killing
untold thousands of its residents.9 Bomber Command
returned on 30 July when 700 bombers struck Hamburg. The final
raid, on 2 August, was the least damaging, only one-half of the
740 bombers dispatched found their targets due to bad weather.10
By 1943, American bombers were leaving their shorter-ranged
escorts behind as they penetrated deep into Germany. On 1 August
1943, 177 bombers from five bombardment groups (two from the
Fifteenth Air Force and three from the Eighth Air Force) raided
the Rumanian oil refineries near Ploesti, 54 aircraft and 532
crew were lost. On 17 August 1943, 376 bombers of the Eighth Air
Force attacked targets in the Regensburg and Schweinfurt area, 60
were lost. The Eighth Air Force revisited the Schweinfurt area
with 291 unescorted bombers on 14 October 2022 and again suffered
the loss of 60 bombers. Though heavily armed and armored, the
American bombers could only repeat the lessons previously learned
by both the Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe,
unescorted bombers conducting daylight raids suffered
unacceptable losses.11 Many Germans, upon viewing the
massed American formations flying over their country in the broad
daylight, assumed initially that the aircraft must be German.
Despite the losses suffered by the Americans, their effort had an
enormous impact upon German public opinion.
On the night of 17/18 August, RAF Bomber Command struck the
German V-weapon installation at Peenemunde. While the strike cost
40 bombers, it set German progress on the V-1 and V-2 weapon
programs back one year. RAF Bomber Command then initiated a
series of raids on the Berlin area with raids on 1 and 4
September 1943. Bomber Command dropped 2,200 tons of bombs on the
area but was unable to ignite a firestorm in the city. Also
raided were the cities of Munich, Dusseldorf, Mannheim,
Ludwigshafen, Hannover, Hagen, Kassel, Leipzig, Nuremberg, and
Stuttgart. By November 1943, Bomber Command listed 19 German
cities as virtually destroyed, 19 as seriously damaged, and 9
more as damaged. Damage was repaired much more quickly than
anticipated, however, and Allied aircraft faced more opposition
rather than less. The heavy bombing had not succeeded in reducing
German production.12
Guy Sajer, a Frenchman serving in the Wehrmacht on the
Eastern Front was on leave in Germany in 1943 and was caught up
in a raid on Magdeburg. He wrote, "On one of the buildings I
could make out a white poster with black letters: SHELTER: THIRTY
PERSONS. Never mind if there were already a hundred! I ran down a
spiral staircase between the only two walls left intact in the
building. A dim lamp which some thoughtful soul had hooked to the
wall lit the turns in the stair. But after two spirals the way
was blocked by a large gray cylinder, which was even taller than
I. I tried to squeeze through the narrow gap next to the stair
wall, but a closer look at the object made my blood freeze, I was
pressing myself against an enormous bomb, whose broken wings
indicated that it had crashed through every floor of the building
from the roof down." Sajer also observed, "The sound of
thousands of panes shattering simultaneously added a crystalline
note to the huge shock produced by bombs of four and five
thousand kilos."13
In autumn 1943, General der Jagdflieger, or General of
Fighter Aircraft, Adolf Galland briefed Hitler and Speer that
some Allied escort fighters had been shot down over the city of
Aachen in western Germany near the Belgian border. Galland warned
Hitler of the consequences should the Americans field longer
range escort fighters capable of accompanying the bombers deep
into Germany. The head of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Goring,
had been denying to Hitler that such escort aircraft existed and
later berated Galland in front of Speer, saying, "I hereby
give you an official order that they [the aircraft] weren't
there." Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe, long-range
P-51 Mustang fighters began arriving in Britain in large numbers
by late 1943. The first of the Mustangs appeared over Germany on
13 December 1943. On 6 March 1944, 730 Eighth Air Force bombers
struck at Berlin, escorted all the way by the new Mustangs. While
the Americans lost 69 bombers, this was a 9.5 per cent loss rate,
compared to the 18-20 per cent loss rate suffered during the
strikes against the Schweinfurt area in August and October 1943.
Meanwhile, the escort fighters began taking a greater toll of the
Luftwaffe. German fighter losses rose from 30 per cent
in January 1944 to around 50 per cent in May and June 1944.
Between January and May 1944, Jagdwaffe, the German
Fighter Command, lost 99 percent of its pilot strength with 2,262
killed or wounded out of a total strength of 2,283.14
In April 1944, the Fifteenth Air Force, then operating out of
southern Italy, began conducting an air offensive against oil
targets. Between 5 April and 19 August 1944, oil targets in the
Ploesti region were struck a total of 19 times.15
Overall, the tempo of aerial attacks increased rapidly in 1944,
with the American forces capable of conducting several massive
raids per month. Often, due to weather, these formations were
forced to bomb through cloud cover through the use of radar. This
lead to a greater dispersion of the payloads and effectively
reduced many precision attacks to area ones.
In the second week of August 1944, German Minister of Munitions
Albert Speer and General der Jagdflieger Galland were
ordered by Hitler to stop all fighter production and switch to
production of anti-aircraft artillery instead. This order was
rescinded by Hitler on 24 August when he approved Speer's request
for limited fighter production. Speer conveniently interpreted
Hitler's approval as meaning that Germany would produce as many
fighters as could be produced, constrained only by the ability of
the German industry to produce these aircraft. At a meeting of
Speer, Galland and representatives of the German aircraft
industry on 24 August 1944, Speer stated , "By sending the
production of fighter aircraft soaring, we can meet the greatest
danger we face, the crushing of our armaments manufacture on the
home front."16
By late 1944, evacuations from both east and west were causing
overcrowding in many parts of Germany. By 25 December 1944, there
were 590,918 requartered persons in the Wurttemberg- Hohenzollern
region alone, one month later this number had risen to 736,488.17
German industry received a respite from the relentless attacks
when the Wehrmacht launched its last-ditch
counteroffensive against American forces in the Ardennes region
of Belgium in December 1944. In what became known as the
"Battle of the Bulge," German ground units penetrated
deep into Allied lines and caused considerable difficulty for the
Allied armies. In order to draw pressure off of the ground
troops, the strategic bombers were diverted to strike
transportation and supply centers in western Germany, thereby
slowing up resupply of the German ground forces.18
The assault on the German transport system did, however, yield
tremendous benefits. The German railway system had been under
great strain ever since the invasion of France in June 1944.
Tactical bombers and fighters had been engaged in an ongoing
offensive against the German rail system and had significantly
reduced the its overall strength. When the strategic forces were
diverted to strike at transportation targets in order to decouple
the German offensive in the Ardennes, it began to collapse. Coal
shipments fell to 39 per cent of normal for hard coal and 16 per
cent of normal for brown coal. By 25 December 1944, 1,100 trains
and 75,000- 100,000 cars were idled. By 18 January 1945, the
number of idled trains had risen to 1,994. Car turnaround times
rose from 6.5 days per car to 20 days per car by January 1945 and
lines were cleared by the drastic expedient of derailing idle
trains. On 19 January 1945, an embargo was placed on all cargo
except Wehrmacht and coal traffic. Dispersed industry
suffered, power generation was cut, and iron and steel production
plummeted by 60-80 per cent overall. The collapse of the
transportation led to a collapse in the production of
ball-bearings and a serious plunge in overall weapons production.19
On 12 January 1945, the Soviet Union opened up its winter
offensive. By 31 January, significant advances were made and
Soviet forces were on the Oder River only 45 miles east of
Berlin. American and British desired to assist this offensive by
destroying transportation centers serving the Eastern Front,
thereby preventing the rapid movement of troops between sectors
and the deployment of troops from the Western Front to the
Eastern Front. A combined British and American campaign against
Berlin had been planned in the summer of 1944 in response to the
German V-1 campaign against London. This campaign, known as
Operation THUNDERCLAP, was not carried out due in part to
American opposition to the concept of terror-bombing. Rather, the
plan had been filed away for reconsideration until the situation
in Germany deteriorated to such an extent that one large blow
against Berlin might shock the government into surrender. With
the German collapse on the Eastern Front, reconsideration was
given to initiating THUNDERCLAP. While many top American officers
were opposed to the concept of terror- bombing, it was recognized
that big raids on Berlin, Leipzig, and Dresden would disrupt the
German ability to defend the Eastern Front. Adding pressure to
the consideration of THUNDERCLAP was a formal request made by the
Soviet government at Yalta to strike both Berlin and Leipzig. On
the night of 13/14 February, 796 British bombers released 2,646
tons of bombs, including 1,181 tons of incendiaries, on the
center of Dresden. Meeting little opposition, a technically
perfect fire-raising attack was conducted. By the early morning
of 14 February, a fire storm engulfed the center of Dresden.
Shortly after noon on 14 February, 311 American bombers dropped
771 tons of bombs, including 294 tons of incendiaries, on the
Dresden marshaling yards. Later that same day, 211 more American
bombers, unable to strike their primary target, the synthetic oil
plant at Ruhland, diverted to their secondary target, Dresden. An
additional 461 tons of bombs, all high explosive, were dropped on
the city. Due to the presence in the city of thousands of
refugees, slave laborers, relocated persons, and even Allied
prisoners of war, an accurate accounting of the casualties was
impossible. Estimates of the death toll ranged from 35,000 to
250,000. Damage to the city's residential areas was great and the
industrial and transportation establishments located within
Dresden were destroyed.20
The collapse of Germany during the final months of the war saw
the Battle Front move through the devastated Home Front. The Ruhr
city of Duisburg suffered its 299th and final air raid on 29
March 1945 only to be subjected to artillery fire on 30 March. As
Allied troops entered Germany, they encountered a wide range of
resistance from the German cities. Karl Kaufmann, the Nazi leader
of Hamburg, arranged to surrender the city to the advancing
British forces after learning of the destruction caused by the
resistance of nearby Bremen.21
The firm control exercised by the Nazi party over all aspects of
the lives of the German people was very important in their
ability to resist the effects of the bombardment. According to
the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, completed in
September 1945, "The mental reaction of the German people to
air attack is significant. Under ruthless Nazi control they
showed surprising resistance to the terror and hardships of
repeated air attack, to the destruction of their homes and
belongings, and to the conditions under which they were reduced
to live. Their morale, their belief in ultimate victory or
satisfactory compromise, and their confidence in their leaders
declined, but they continued to work efficiently as long as the
physical means of production remained. The power of a
police state over its people cannot be underestimated
[emphasis added]."22
To conclude, a quote from the United States Strategic Bombing
Survey, "Allied air power was decisive in the war in western
Europe. . . Its power and superiority made possible the success
of the invasion. It brought the economy which sustained the
enemy's armed forces to virtual collapse, although the full
effects of this collapse had not reached the enemy's front lines
when they were overrun by Allied forces. It brought home to the
German people the full impact of modern war with all its horror
and suffering. Its imprint on the German nation will be
lasting."23
Notes
1. These pessimistic attitudes resulted in many problems when the
war started. In the early weeks of the Battle of Britain, the
British government found that there were more than enough shrouds
in which to bury the anticipated dead, however, there were no
plans prepared for the evacuation of the unanticipated living.
2. Air power can be applied to attack either tactical or
strategic targets. Tactical targets are generally found in the
vicinity of the front line and are directly involved in
supporting or supplying ground forces in the field. Tactical
targets include airfields, supply centers, bridges, troop
mobilization centers, and road and rail systems. Strategic
targets, however, are generally found far behind the front lines
and are industries vital for a country to engage in modern
warfare. Strategic targets include aircraft and vehicle
production plants, munitions plants, shipyards, oil refineries,
power plants, chemical plants, and transportation systems.
3. Robin Higham, "The Royal Air Force and the Battle of
Britain," in Case Studies in the Achievements of Air
Superiority, pages 130-140. By early September, the German
attack had the Royal Air Force on the ropes. Losses in the
previous two weeks had been 200 aircraft more than had been
produced and reserve aircraft were at an all time low of 127.
Pilot losses were heavy as well, with over 300 lost during August
alone. Of the 1,000 pilots in Fighter Command at the start of the
war, only 250 remained. Had the German offensive continued,
Fighter Command would have run out of aircraft. The diversion of
attention from Fighter Command to London, although costly in
terms of civilian casualties, gave some respite to the British
defenses and allowed them to be rebuilt. An excellent overview of
the Battle of Britain is available in Case Studies in the
Achievements of Air Superiority prepared by the Center for
Air Force History in 1994.
4. Len Deighton, Blood, Tears, and Folly, pages 391-395.
Other German bombs included oil- filled Flammenbombe,
benzene-phosphorus Phosphorbrandbombe, and modified sea
mines deployed via parachute as aerial land mines. These mines
were detonated by barometric pressure fuses and were designed to
explode above ground to cause widespread damage.
5. Deighton, L. Blood, Tears, and Folly, page 597.
Apparently, the December 1941 raid on Hamburg had little effect
on the city.
6. Earl Beck, Under the Bombs, pages 1-9. The first
1,000 aircraft raid was intended more to boost British morale
than destroy Cologne. In order to get the number of aircraft
dispatched to the 1,000 mark, Bomber Command dispatched nearly
every aircraft they possessed and even borrowed aircraft from
Training Command and Coastal Command in order to make their mark.
7. Beck, E., Under the Bombs, pages 19 and 72. The
British area attacks were a result of the lack of reliable
navigational technology to guide the bombers to their targets.
Pilots, flying at night, had the option of relying either on
celestial navigation or dead reckoning, neither of which were
very accurate. With the advent of radio navigation and, later, of
aerial radar bombing systems, pilots flying at night could at
least find the cities, although they still could not accurately
bomb them.
8. Robert Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, pages
148-149. In the 1941-1942 time frame, American planners
contemplated the early initiation of sustained air offensives
against both Germany and Japan. These plans did not, however,
accord overriding production to the respective air forces for the
undertaking of these offensives. Instead, the strategic planners
posed requirements for the development of land, sea, and air
forces to accomplish a series of surface campaigns designed
eventually to culminate in invasion of the German and Japanese
homelands. The strategic planners recognized the need for the
invasion of the enemy homelands, strategic bombardment to them
was a way to increase the friction of war upon the enemy
economies and make it more difficult for them to produce and
deploy weapons for use against Allied forces. American strategic
planners had one purpose, how to win the war with assurance and
the fewest American casualties.
9. A firestorm is a phenomena where the fires burn so hot that
the thermal plumes they generate draw air into the fire from
outside the burning areas. This air rushing into the fire thereby
feeds the fire and increases the intensity, which then increases
the thermal plume. The cycle continues to increase until the
fires consume all flammable material in the area. In a true
firestorm, such as the one in Hamburg, surface temperatures
easily exceed 1,500 degrees Fahrenheit. Due to the winds blowing
towards the center of the fire, however, the phenomenon does tend
to be self- limited to a certain degree. Destruction is virtually
complete and even people in deep shelters are killed, either by
heat or more often by suffocation. European cities, with their
many stone buildings and wide streets, were generally not prone
to firestorms. The most devastating firestorms would actually be
ignited in Japanese cities. During an early fire raid on Tokyo,
in March 1945, over 15 square miles of the city were destroyed
and over 90,000 people perished.
10. Beck, E. Under the Bombs, pages 65-75. The aftermath
of the Hamburg raids convinced Field Marshall Erhard Milch, Reich
Director of Air Armament, and Albert Speer, Reich Minister of
Munitions, that greater attention must be paid to the defense of
the homeland. They advocated defense of the homeland even at the
cost of the aerial coverage of the battle front. They also
advocated the all-out production of the Me-262 jet-engined
fighters and the V-1 flying bombs.
11. A detailed discussion of the American daylight bombardment
campaign can be found in Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in
Europe (1993).
12. American and British strategic planners could not explain how
German fighter and anti- aircraft strength could be increasing
given the increasing tempo of air attacks. What they had no way
of knowing, due to their lack of strategic intelligence, was that
the German economy was only then being placed on a complete war
footing. Much of the destruction caused in 1942 and 1943 was
offset by conversion of the industry from consumer goods and
civilian items to war materials. For example, even though the
country had been at war since 1939, civilian automobiles were
still being produced, in limited numbers, in 1943. Conversely,
the United States terminated the production of civilian
automobiles in 1942, after being at war for less than six months.
Quite simply, the German economy had a lot of slack in it and was
able to increase production of war material even though
increasing damage was being done by the strategic bombing
campaign.
13. Guy Sajer, The Forgotten Soldier (1967), page 135.
The largest RAF bombs from the start of the war until 1942 were
900 kilograms in weight. By the summer 1942, the largest bombs
had increased to 1,800 kilograms and to 3,600 kilograms by fall
1942. By the end of the war, the RAF had fielded "Grand
Slam" bombs as large as 10,000 kilograms. The detonation of
these very large bombs caused seismic damage to buildings and
buried water, sewer, and gas lines. The intent was, however, that
the large high explosive bombs would blow doors and windows open
so the draft would increase the effect of the incendiary bombs
which were always dropped in large numbers. Incendiary bombs also
became more sophisticated as the war progressed with later models
containing rubber and liquid asphalt, making them stick to their
targets and difficult to extinguish. During the war, the cities
of Berlin and Munich both received over 2,000,000 incendiary
bombs, while Frankfurt and Nuremberg both received over
1,000,000.
14. David Baker, Adolf Galland (1996), pages 243-246.
American long-range escorts saved the daylight bomber offensive.
In September 1943, fewer than 300 long range escorts were
available, by mid-1944 this total had risen to over 1,000. As the
American fighter strength increased, the Luftwaffe
fighters had a more difficult time organizing for attacks on the
bomber formations because American fighters would break up their
concentrations. German twin- engine interceptors like the Me-110
and Me-410 were particularly vulnerable. American fighters were
given wide latitude by their commander, Lt. General Jimmy
Doolittle, who recognized that at least some of the fighters had
to be free to roam in search of the German fighters rather than
being tied to the bombers. The result was that the Luftwaffe
was not able to attack as frequently or with as great a severity
as had previously been possible. Allied losses to German fighters
would decline until, by mid-1944, more aircraft were lost to
German anti- aircraft fire than to German fighters.
15. William Hess, B-17 Flying Fortress (1974), pages
155-156. The Ploesti oil fields were Germany's most important
producers of natural oil. They were overrun by Soviet forces in
September 1944. Their loss crippled the Luftwaffe.
Aircraft engines rely on high-octane fuel for maximum performance
and Ploesti was a source of high-quality oil. Additionally, the Luftwaffe
required large quantities of fuel to train replacement pilots.
With the onset of shortages of fuel in 1944, the amount of
training time provided to each Luftwaffe pilot was
reduced, even as American and British pilots were increasing
their training regime prior to entry into combat. By July 1944,
German replacement pilots averaged just over 100 hours of flying
experience while British and American pilots averaged closer to
350 hours of flying experience. During this same time period,
German replacement pilots averaged less than 50 hours of
experience flying fighter aircraft while American pilots averaged
in excess of 150 hours of experience flying fighter aircraft. The
American replacement pilots, on average, had more flight time in
advanced fighter aircraft than the German replacement pilots had
in all types of aircraft, including trainers.
16. Baker, D. Adolf Galland, pages 255-257. By August
1944, German fighter production had already risen dramatically.
In June 1944, Germany produced 2,449 fighters, this rose to 2,954
in July, 3,020 in August, and peaked at 3,375 in September 1944.
German bomber production fell from 767 in June 1944 to 326 in
October 1944 and transport production was virtually eliminated by
this time as well. By September 1944, 82 per cent of all German
aircraft produced were fighters. Unfortunately for Galland, by
the time the new fighters came available, there was a serious
shortage of fuel and replacement pilots to operate them.
Illustrating their severe lack of strategic intelligence, Allied
estimates were that Germany was producing 1,000 to 1,500 fighters
monthly during this time period.
17. Beck, E. Under the Bombs, page 155. Not only was
Germany becoming crowded with refugees, but the German
importation of foreign labor at a time when a significant portion
of its manpower was committed to combat units at the front led to
considerable uneasiness among the German civilian population.
There was always concern that the foreign workers, some of whom
were poorly treated, would cause disturbances or even uprisings.
18. Davis, R., Air War In Europe, pages 538-540. By
January 1945, this diversion away from German industry had
American strategic planners worried. The most conservative
estimates held that the Luftwaffe would have 300-400
jets available for daily use by 1 July 1945. Because jet engines
did not require high octane fuel, they were not threatened by the
oil campaign. Rather, a campaign against jet assembly plants, jet
engine plants, and airfields associated with jet training or jet
deployment would be required.
19. Davis, R., Air War in Europe, pages 531-538. Many
industries, such as jet aircraft production, had been widely
dispersed in response to the increasing attacks by strategic
bombers. Ironically, it was this dispersal which contributed
significantly to the overall collapse of many sectors of German
industry when the transportation system collapsed.
20. Davis, R., Air War in Europe, pages 543-558. Air War
in Europe contains a detailed accounting of the decisions leading
up to the bombing of Dresden and the aftermath of that bombing.
21. Beck, E., Under the Bombs, pages 193-194. Hamburg
was the only city to surrender with the assistance of its Nazi
leader. Kaufmann, however, had already earned a reputation as
somewhat of a maverick among Nazi leaders for caring for his
people and for appealing to Hitler to visit the city and view the
effects of the July 1943 catastrophe.
22. Strategic Bombing Survey, page 107. The survey
raised a number of additional points in its overall conclusion.
These can be summarized as follows: 1) A first-class military
power cannot live long under full-scale and free exploitation of
air weapons over the heart of its territory. 2) The domination of
the air was essential. 3) As the air offensive gained in tempo,
the Germans were unable to prevent the decline and eventual
collapse of their economy. 4) Attacks against basic industries
were more effective than those against the armaments industry or
in the city areas. 5) No indispensable industry was put out of
commission by a single attack. Persistent reattack was necessary.
6) There was an important need for further and more accurate
strategic intelligence about the German economy, especially
before and during the early phases of the war. 7) Among the most
significant other factors which contributed to the success of the
air effort was the extraordinary progress during the war of
Allied research, development, and production. 8) the success of
the Allied air effort depended upon the courage, fortitude, and
gallant action of the officers and men of the air crews and
commands.
23. A total of 30 appendices which provide detailed statistics on
the air campaign in Europe can be found in Carl A. Spaatz and
the Air War in Europe (1993). Selected statistics include:
Battle casualties suffered by the American aerial forces in the
European campaign totaled 94,565, of which 30,099 were killed,
13,360 were wounded, and 51,106 were missing. The worst year was
1944, when the American aerial forces suffered 61,426 casualties.
Monthly crew losses between January 1944 and May 1945 ranged from
a low of 465 to a high of 1,070.
Between May and November 1944, the total number of American
bombardment groups peaked at 41, from April 1944 onwards a
minimum of 30 fighter groups were available. The number of
bombers available rose from 2,672 in January 1944 to 5,334 in
January 1945 and peaked at 5,559 in April 1945. The number of
fighters available rose from 4,111 in January 1944 to 5,614 in
January 1945 and peaked at 6,003 in April 1945. Of the 22,948
American aircraft lost in combat during the war, 18,418 were lost
in the campaign against Germany.
A total of 1,693,565 combat sorties were flown by the American
forces in the campaign against Germany, during which a total of
1,554,463 tons of bombs were dropped.